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Non-Technical Summary
Since the seminal work of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958, no generally
accepted capital structure theory has emerged. Consequently this paper does not aim to
validate any of the capital structure theories. In fact, in our paper we focus on `ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility' as an important determining factor for the capital structure of ﬁrms according
to surveys among CFOs (see e.g. Suﬁ (2009) and Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010)).
Gamba and Triantis (2008) directly address this concept and provide the following deﬁ-
nition: Financial ﬂexibility represents the ability of a ﬁrm to access and restructure its
ﬁnancing at a low cost. Financially ﬂexible ﬁrms are able to avoid ﬁnancial distress in
the face of negative shocks, and to readily fund investment when proﬁtable opportunities
arise.
We hypothesize that ﬁnancial ﬂexibility  as the interactions of leverage, cash & cash
equivalents and lines of credit  is a broader, but more consistent, concept in explain-
ing the dynamics of ﬁnancing activities than traditional capital structure theory. In our
study, leverage  the pivotal point of every capital structure study  is investigated by
two spotlights. Spotlight A is deﬁned as ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, in the sense of anticipating
liquidity management. In this context, we analyze the deviation of the most important
balance sheet items induced by changes of leverage, cash & cash equivalents and lines of
credit. This approach, albeit new in its broad extent, is the classical model organization of
capital structure studies. The innovative spotlight B distinguishes between real stochas-
tic and mainly mechanical relationships of the ratio `leverage' and its fractionalized debt
and equity component. This approach takes into account that the leverage ratio of an
average ﬁrm reverts to mean mechanically. Without knowledge of this characteristic, the
economic interpretation of the results could be misleading (Chen and Zhao (2007)).
Our results are based on observing US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and
Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs) from 1995 to 2010. By focusing on real estate
data, we avoid a dilution of diﬀerent industry sector eﬀects. The results of perspective A
emphasize the substitutive relationship between leverage and credit lines, backed by the
existing literature. This clariﬁes the importance of credit lines for ﬁrms' liquidity man-
agement. The positive inﬂuence of leverage on cash & cash equivalents is new evidence
and contrary to previous research. This eﬀect  which appears especially in downturns
 can be explained by the ﬁrms' strategy to accumulate cash to fund investment when
proﬁtable opportunities arise. The results of perspective B conﬁrm our hypothesized ef-
fect that leverage as a ratio would neglect the speciﬁc inﬂuence on its components and
cause misleading interpretation of the eﬀects. At this point, we would like to point out
the inﬂuence of operating cash ﬂow. In economic upturns, a cash ﬂow increase impacts
more investments, ﬁnanced by equity, but leverage remains unchanged. In downturns,
investment expenses are funded by debt corresponding with a leverage increase. Besides
these highlighted results, our paper presents the inﬂuence of eight traditional and new
capital structure variables in 22 diﬀerent subsamples for perspective A as well as for B.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Seit der grundlegenden Arbeit zum Gebiet der Kapitalstruktur von Franco Modigliani
und Merton Miller aus dem Jahr 1958 konnte sich bis dato keine Kapitalstrukturthe-
orie als allgemeingültig durchsetzen. Daher beabsichtigt dieser Artikel auch nicht eine
der Theorien zu bewerten, sondern konzentriert sich auf ein relativ neues Konzept als
einen der wichtigsten Treiber für das Kalkül von Finanzierungsentscheidungen, die `ﬁ-
nanzielle Flexibilität'. Deren Bedeutung wurde bereits in mehreren wissenschaftlichen
Umfragen unter Finanzvorständen hervorgehoben (siehe z.B. Suﬁ (2009) und Lins et al.
(2010)). Gamba und Triantis (2008), die ebenfalls in ihrem wissenschaftlichen Artikel das
Konzept aufgreifen, geben dabei folgende Deﬁnition: Finanzielle Flexibilität repräsen-
tiert die Fähigkeit einer Unternehmung, auf Finanzierungsaktivitäten zu geringen Kosten
zuzugreifen und diese neu zu strukturieren. Finanziell ﬂexible Firmen sind dabei in der
Lage, ﬁnanzielle Engpässe in Zeiten negativer Marktbedingungen zu vermeiden und In-
vestitionen zu tätigen, sobald sich gewinnbringende Möglichkeiten ergeben.
Wir stellen die Hypothese auf, dass die `ﬁnanzielle Flexibilität', also das Zusammen-
spiel von Verschuldungsgrad, kurzfristig verfügbarem Kapital und zugesagten Kredit-
linien, ein breiteres aber dennoch einheitlicheres Konzept im Vergleich zu traditionellen
Kapitalstrukturtheorien darstellt, um die Wechselbeziehungen von Finanzierungsaktiv-
itäten und Bilanzposten zu erklären. In unserer Untersuchung wird der Verschuldungs-
grad  das Hauptaugenmerk jeder Kapitalstrukturstudie  aus zwei Perspektiven beleuchtet.
Perspektive A erfasst die ﬁnanzielle Flexibilität im Sinne des Liquiditätsmanagements.
Wir analysieren in diesem Zusammenhang die Abweichungen der wichtigsten Bilanz-
posten, die sich durch Änderungen bei Verschuldungsgrad, kurzfristig verfügbarem Kap-
ital und zugesagten Kreditlinien, ergeben. Dieser Ansatz, auch wenn in seinem Um-
fang neu, entspricht der klassischen Herangehensweise bei Untersuchungen von Kapi-
talstrukturfragen. Die innovative Perspektive B unterscheidet zwischen der mechanis-
chen Beziehung des Quotienten 'Verschuldungsgrad' und den Änderungen seiner einzelnen
Komponenten `Eigen- und Fremdkapital'. Hierbei wird der Tatsache Rechnung getragen,
dass der Verschuldungsgrad aufgrund seiner Konstruktion rein mechanisch zum Mittelw-
ert zurückkehrt und eine Vernachlässigung dieser Eigenschaft zu einer Fehlinterpretation
der Ergebnisse führen würde (Chen und Zhao, 2007).
Unsere Ergebnisse basieren auf den Daten von US-amerikanischen Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts (REITs) und Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs) im zur Verfügung
stehenden Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2010. Die Beschränkung auf diesen reinen Immobilien-
datensatz ermöglicht es, sich auf branchentypische Einﬂüsse zu fokusieren. Die Ergebnisse
für Perspektive A verdeutlichen nochmals den aus der aktuellen Literatur bekannten sub-
stitutiven Eﬀekt zwischen Verschuldungsgrad und Kreditlinien. Dieses Resultat unter-
streicht die ökonomische Bedeutung der Kreditlinie als Liquiditätsmanagementinstrument
für die Unternehmen. Bemerkenswert und neu ist das Ergebnis, dass Erhöhungen des
Verschuldungsgrads auch zur marginalen Erhöhung des kurzfristig verfügbaren Kapitals
führen. Ein Eﬀekt, der vor allem vor der Finanzkrise zu beobachten war und als strate-
gische Akkumulation von Kapital für zukünftige Projekte zu verstehen ist. Die Ergeb-
nisse für Perspektive B bestätigen die vermutete Annahme, dass der Verschuldungsgrad
Informationen verschluckt und eine reine Betrachtung der Größe `Verschuldungsgrad' zu
Fehlinterpretationen führen würde. Hervorzuheben ist hierbei der Einﬂuss des operativen
Cashﬂows auf die Bilanzstruktur. In Zeiten wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs führt eine Er-
höhung des Cashﬂows zu Investitionsausgaben, die durch Eigenkapital ﬁnanziert werden,
und zu keinem signiﬁkanten Einﬂuss auf den Verschuldungsgrad. Dahingegen werden
im Abschwung Investitionsausgaben v. a. durch eine Fremdkapitalerhöhung ﬁnanziert,
die den Verschuldungsgrad steigen lassen. Neben diesen Ergebnissen liefert die Studie
sowohl für Perspektive A als auch B den Einﬂuss von acht verschiedenen traditionellen
und neueren Kapitalstruktureinﬂussgrößen in 22 verschiedenen Subsamples.
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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic multi-equation model based on a balance sheet
identity, where technical aspects of capital structure are highlighted through sepa-
rately observing debt and equity and their relationship to investment. Additionally,
leverage dynamics are interpreted in their role for liquidity management. Interac-
tions of leverage with lines of credit (LOC) and cash are considered in the light
of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. The major ﬁndings obtained by observing US REITs and
REOCs from 1995 to 2010 are as follows. In accordance with the existing literature,
cash and LOC reveal a substitute relationship. However, the calculus of ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility and our ﬁndings suggest that leverage positively drives cash, which is
consistent with Gamba and Triantis (2008), and also with the accepted perspective
of debt minus cash being net debt (Spotlight A). Consequently, the very robust re-
sults indicate that leverage eliminates a signiﬁcant amount of information. Further
mechanical relationships, especially for market leverage, are suggested (Spotlight B).
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1 Introduction
The persistently large number of capital structure studies since the seminal work of
Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not yield consistent evidence for one speciﬁc capital
structure theory. This study does not aim to validate any of these theories, but follows
Graham and Harvey (2001), who state that ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is the single most im-
portant determinant of capital structure according to CFOs. Investigating ﬁrm cash
holdings, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argues: Firms want to avoid
situations where the agency costs of debt are so high that they cannot raise funds to
ﬁnance their activities and invest in valuable projects. Obviously, one way to do so is to
choose a low level of leverage. A more recent example of this stream of research is the
proposal of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007), aimed at ﬁlling the gap in capital structure
theory and the associated empirical ﬁndings. They state: Financial Flexibility is the
critical missing link for an empirically viable [capital structure] theory. Gamba and Tri-
antis (2008) directly address this concept and provide the following deﬁnition: Financial
ﬂexibility represents the ability of a ﬁrm to access and restructure its ﬁnancing at a low
cost. Financially ﬂexible ﬁrms are able to avoid ﬁnancial distress in the face of negative
shocks, and to readily fund investment when proﬁtable opportunities arise.
In the present study, approximation leverage (LEV) is investigated by two spotlights.
Financial ﬂexibility, in the sense of anticipating liquidity management, is addressed by
Spotlight A. Interactions of LEV with cash & cash equivalents (CCE) and lines of credit
(LOC) form the focus. The more technical one (Spotlight B) is motivated by the argu-
ments of Chen and Zhao (2007) and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010). Spotlight
B ensures robust results, distinguishing between real stochastic and mainly mechanical
relationships.
The recent late-2000s ﬁnancial crisis in particular, provides the motivation for in-
vestigating Spotlight A. There is consensus in the existing literature on a substitute
relationship between CCE and LOC. This is due to the fact that LOC hedge against
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underinvestment, and CCE against cash ﬂow (CF) shortfalls (Lins, Servaes, and Tufano
(2010)). However, what was evident immediately after the peak of the crisis is that
ﬁrms draw their available LOC, fearing that they will be canceled due to covenant breaks
(Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010)). Suﬁ (2009) also supports the view that CCE
and LOC are only conditional substitutes. Therefore, this study aims to ﬁll the gap in
the literature, by including LEV in the interactions of sources of liquidity management.
Furthermore, another issue of the late-2000s ﬁnancial crisis is the perceived increased
relevance of the real estate industry. Many studies argue that there is homogeneity in
the REIT industry due to legislation, e.g. aspects such as the role of taxes or retained
cash ﬂows are of lower relevance. Hence, more consistent ﬁndings are expected when
concentrating on REITs. Another interesting circumstance within this industry is the
underutilization of CCE, as opposed to a similar level of importance of LOC, compared
to companies outside the real estate industry. This may be due to the fact that the high
dividend payout restriction prevents REITs from accumulating cash. Yet, recent research
by Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) reports that REITs voluntarily choose to pay
'excess dividends'  up to 38% of their total assets.
This paper is organized traditionally. Section 2 provides an overview of the related
literature. In section 3, the data are described. Section 4 introduces our model. In section
5, we present the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 General Motivation
At ﬁrst, both the general ﬁnance literature, as well as real estate studies, seem to reach no
empirically robust consensus on classical capital structure theories. One could cautiously
claim that recent research in this ﬁeld agrees on a mixture of trade-oﬀ and market-timing
theory as valid. This is justiﬁed mainly by market timing allowing equity issuances to
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be preferable in some states of the economy.1 Furthermore, LEV often reveals a mean-
reversion characteristic; hence, target-leverage is interpreted as a validation of the trade-
oﬀ theory (Flannery and Rangan (2006)).
Hence, the second argument is motivated by Chen and Zhao (2007), who demonstrate,
using the sample of Flannery and Rangan (2006), how their ﬁndings can be justiﬁed by a
purely mechanical characteristic. This is due to the fact that leverage is 'just' a ratio and
has insuﬃcient implications for capital structure dynamics, thus making it an inadequate
tool for distinguishing between diﬀerent ﬁnancing policies.
The third argument is based on the relevance of taxes to ﬁnancing decisions, if one
argues in favor of the trade-oﬀ theory. Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) investigate the
widespread belief in the underutilization of debt. This is supported indirectly by DeAn-
gelo and DeAngelo (2007). They do not exclude a tax-shield, but emphasize that pre-
serving debt capacity, in order to forego investment distortions in the near future, out-
weighs the few cents on the dollar beneﬁt of debt. Finally, the present study observes
mainly REITs, which are pass-through entities with respect to the main business activi-
ties. Hence, a tax-shield is assumed to be of no relevance for this paper.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) recognize the dilemma of capital structure research
and formulate a draft aimed at ﬁlling the gap between the traditional theories and em-
pirical ﬁndings. They argue that it is the 'equity as the last resort' attribute of the
pecking-order theory, and the 'non-occurrence of levering up after stock price increases'
of market-timing, and the 'high dividend-low leverage' characteristic of proﬁtable ﬁrms of
trade-oﬀ theory which necessitate innovations in this ﬁeld of research. Their alternative
approach to explaining capital structure is based on interpreting management actions
in the light of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, e.g. preserving debt capacity for facilitating potential
future ﬁnancial needs.
1For this reason, pecking-order is often rejected, but seems to be valid for large ﬁrms with low market-
to-book-ratio but high cash-ﬂows (Leary and Roberts (2010)).
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The above mentioned arguments motivate focusing on leverage with two spotlights:
from the one perspective, leverage is 'just' a ratio, which absorbs valuable information
by deﬁnition. From the other perspective, as a ratio, leverage is one source of liquidity
management; hence, it competes with other sources of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. The ﬁrst
spotlight can be seen as the more technical one, while the second may be interpreted
rather as an alternative approach to solving the capital structure puzzle.2 The following
section brieﬂy summarizes recent research relevant to these two spotlights.
2.2 Spotlight A: Leverage, Cash & Cash Equivalents and Lines
of Credit
There is a wide range of literature on CCE versus LOC, generally agreeing that these
sources may be assumed to constitute substitutes.3 Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) ac-
cord diﬀerent purposes to CCE and LOC, with respect to the state of the economy. They
argue that LOC serve to ﬁnance value-raising projects when they arise, while CCE hedge
against CF shortfalls. Suﬁ (2009) investigates the dependence of ﬁrm characteristics on
the use of one or the other source. High CF-generating ﬁrms maintain LOC, because
of the strong link between ﬁnancial covenants and credit facilities. Suﬁ also argues that
the unavailability of LOC is a superior proxy for being ﬁnancially constrained (for ﬁrms
with a high degree of information asymmetry see also An, Hardin, and Wu (2010)). Ac-
cordingly, a positive CF-CCE sensitivity would only prevail for constrained ﬁrms, which
do not have a LOC. Interpreting LOC as the nominal amount of debt capacity (see also
Riddiough and Wu (2009)), Suﬁ (2009) highlights the relevance of cash ﬂow and debt
measures for credit agreements. With cash ﬂow decreases being associated with covenant
violations, CCE is only a conditional substitute for LOC. Hardin, Highﬁeld, Hill, and
2Because much is said about capital structure theories, namely trade-oﬀ, pecking-order and market-
timing theory, we forego the reproduction and refer to Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007), Hardin and Wu
(2010) or Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011) for the real estate market or Hovakimian, Hovakimian,
and Tehranian (2004) or Flannery and Rangan (2006) for the general ﬁnance literature.
3For interview based studies, see Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) in 2005 or Campello, Graham, and
Harvey (2010) in 2008. For empirical studies based on the real estate market see Hardin, Highﬁeld,
Hill, and Kelly (2009) or Suﬁ (2009) for broad market evidence.
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Kelly (2009) conﬁrm a substitutive relationship between CCE and LOC. Moreover, the
authors state that REIT managers choose not to accumulate cash, preferring to ﬁnance
externally, gaining from reduced agency conﬂicts of monitoring and reduced costs of ﬁ-
nancing.
While empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between LEV and CCE
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999); Ozkan and Ozkan (2004); Hardin,
Highﬁeld, Hill, and Kelly (2009)), our perspective suggests a positive, but non-linear
relationship. This becomes clear when considering the insurance aspects of both instru-
ments: low leverage preserves debt capacity, i.e. the ability to borrow in the future, high
cash reserves hedge against the risk of underinvestment and cash ﬂow shortfalls, but
mainly against the latter. This view is supported by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010),
who ﬁnd no signiﬁcant (contemporaneous) relationship, but refer to argument which we
have just stated. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) also favor the hedging argument of CCE
for underinvestment, but predict a negative correlation of LEV and CCE. Gamba and
Triantis (2008) investigate a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, driven by levels of borrowing and
lending. By controlling cash and debt, the resulting positive net debt implicates a higher
ﬁrm value, although with a decreasing marginal eﬀect with respect to the mixture of cash
and debt.4 Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) also argue that CCE constitutes
negative debt. Their implications are dependent on varying degrees of hedging needs,
namely a lower risk of underinvestment implicating that ﬁrms pay down their outstand-
ing debt.
Moreover, a negative relationship between LEV and LOC seems to be empirically
robust, as well as consistent with the calculus of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. Riddiough and Wu
(2009) declare that REITs increased dividend payout in the 1990 to 2003 period, leaving
these speciﬁc companies with lower cash reserves than non-REITs, whereas the use of
LOC is comparable. Therefore, interpreting a high LEV as the inability to borrow in the
4Hill, Kelly, and Hardin (2010) report a $1.34 increase ($0.30 decrease) of ﬁrm value due to a $1 increase
of CCE (one standard deviation increase of unused LOC) based on empirical investigation of REITs.
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future (e.g. Gamba and Triantes 2008)  and hence classiﬁed as the reciprocal of debt ca-
pacity  LEV and LOC yield reverse dynamics. Second, LEV accounts for drawing LOC
and the change of other external sources of ﬁnance. Third, since the dynamics between
LEV and CCE, as well as LOC, have not been comprehensively empirically investigated,
the stochastic properties of the variables of interest would allow at least the following
prediction. Assuming that CCE and LOC are not independent of each other, namely
negative, a reverse relationship of LEV applies to each of them. Assuming positive CCE-
LEV dynamics, the hypothesized sign of LEV and LOC follows technically.
Summarizing the arguments of Spotlight A, the liquidity sources have diﬀerent tasks,
but are dependent on ﬁrm characteristics, as well as the state of the economy. Moreover,
a preference for one or the other may depend on the original level.
2.3 Spotlight B: Leverage is 'just' a Ratio
The second spotlight on leverage takes properties of this ratio into account. If equity
and debt increase by the same percentage, a leverage ratio will simply cancel out these
dynamics, but total (i.e. non-current) assets increase. The relative position of debt still
plays a signiﬁcant role in terms of anticipative liquidity policy, but in order to diﬀerenti-
ate between ﬁnancial actions, debt and equity must be treated separately.
Today's decisions are determined jointly, they are dependent on what happened in
the past and also inﬂuence the (unknown) future. Therefore, the ﬁrst imperative, when
dealing with ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is dynamic modeling. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan
(2010) distinguish between debt and equity, and do so between all the main aggregates
from the cash-ﬂow statement  one example of a more cash-ﬂow-focused mentality since
the late-2000s ﬁnancial crisis. The authors detect a much lower sensitivity of investment
to shocks to cash ﬂows, concluding that ﬁnancing sensitivity with respect to cash ﬂows
is much more relevant than investment responses. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010)
deﬁne an identity where one dollar cash in-ﬂow corresponds exactly to one dollar cash
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outﬂow. Chen and Zhao (2007) also worked with an accounting identity in which assets
are deﬁned by last year's assets plus the change in debt, equity and retained earnings.
The authors suggest that ﬁrms levered below the median increase leverage by increas-
ing debt, but highly levered ﬁrms increase equity while decreasing debt. Almeida and
Campello (2007) also investigate ﬁnancing-investment sensitivities with respect to the
state of the market and ﬁrm characteristics. They agree that cash-ﬂow shocks aﬀect
primarily constrained ﬁrms. However, the portion of tangible assets in particular, deter-
mines the procyclical aspect of debt capacity with respect to the business cycle.
In summary, the importance of distinguishing between the numerator and denomina-
tor of LEV is the focus of the second spotlight on LEV. In addition to research surrounding
LEV, CCE and LOC, the relevance of real assets (investment) and cash ﬂow is deter-
mined. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) suggest new testable hypothesis [...] for future
research [...] [is that] ﬁrms' long-run leverage targets are inversely related in cross-section
and time-series to the (investment distortion-reducing) value of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility.
2.4 Research Goal from a Bird's Eye
In a perfect world, there is no need to hoard cash or hedge in any other way, because
ﬁrms have access to the capital market at any time without transactions costs, when
investment opportunities arrive. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) deﬁne
a ﬁrm as being short of liquid assets, if it has to sell assets or cut capital expenditures
or dividends. By contrast, this paper considers how, dependent on the state of the econ-
omy and ﬁrm characteristics, investment funding is inﬂuenced by the drivers of ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility, namely debt capacity (reciprocal LEV), CCE and LOC. However, we adjust
the concept of assuming an optimum amount of 'ﬁnancial ﬂexibility'. The marginal costs
of being short of money in periods when a ﬁrm would actually need funding are a de-
creasing function with respect to instruments of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. On the other hand,
foregoing borrowing power in terms of LEV (on balance, but not directly measurable in
terms of being ﬁnancially constrained), the opportunity costs of CCE (on balance and
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fully measurable) and fees for the availability of LOC (oﬀ balance and partly measurable
in terms of eﬃciency) act in a contrary manner, so as to antagonize these marginal costs.
Therefore, there has to be an optimum where the marginal costs of underinvestment and
ﬁnancial distress coincide with the costs associated with being ﬁnancially ﬂexible. Despite
the fact that CCE plays a minor role for real estate companies, this is an unconditional
source for hedging underinvestment, if outside investors are unwilling to provide funds.
Yet, cash hedges particularly eﬀectively in economic downturns, since a low-leverage ﬁrm
would still be dependent on external capital. LOC agreements could be canceled in the
event of covenant breaks. However, of the three sources, CCE is associated most strongly
with costs of asymmetric information, because outsiders doubt the appropriate use by
managers, while debt has the advantage of monitoring (Hardin, Highﬁeld, Hill, and Kelly
(2009)).5
Figure 1: Concept of Financial Flexibility
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the equilibrium between the costs of ﬁnancial ﬂexibil-
ity and (in-)direct costs associated with underinvestment and ﬁnancial distress.
From this perspective, the objective function describes the ability to secure suﬃcient
ﬁnancial resources and to raise suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources to implement proﬁtable in-
vestments with respect to uncertainty and the eﬃciency constraint in terms of the direct
5For the relevance of information asymmetry for a ﬁrm's choice between CCE and LOC, see also An,
Hardin, and Wu (2010).
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and indirect costs of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. We hypothesize that ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is a
broader, but more consistent concept in explaining the dynamics of ﬁnancing activities,
compared to traditional capital structure theory.
3 Data
The SEC statements compiled by SNL Financial are the basis of our panel data set.
The initial sample contains 316 operating and acquired or defunct US Equity REITs and
REOCs traded on the NYSE, NYSE Amex Equities and NASDAQ from 1996 to 2010,
with 56% non-missing values. Company foundations and liquidations are responsible for
79% of the missing values, whereas 21% are due to unreported data. The broad an-
nouncements of cash ﬂow statements in SNL from 1996 onwards, as well as the dynamic
modeling, including lagged diﬀerences, restrict the sample to the 1998-2010 period and
eliminate 36 ﬁrms with less than three consecutive years.6
Table (1) provides deﬁnitions and computations of the variables and approximations
used in this study. All ﬁnancial variables are truncated at the 5th and 95th percentile.
LEV (LOC) is cut at the 95th percentile only, because 6% (9%) of the observations are
zero. The truncation is to a lesser extent intended to reduce the inﬂuence of outliers,
rather than to focus the study on ﬁrms with typical ﬁnancial characteristics. Subse-
quently, the end-of-year ﬁnancial data are deﬂated by the US Producer Price Index of
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Therefore, the ﬁnal sample includes 140 Equity REITs
and REOCs corresponding to 558 ﬁrm-year observations.
Research on cash balances suggests the need to scale variables by non-cash assets, in
order to forego mechanical relationships (see Suﬁ (2009)), analogous to the arguments
associated with Spotlight B. However, since debt scaled by assets (leverage) would de-
crease after CCE scaled by non-cash assets has increased for mechanical reasons, we scale
6A further reason for starting in 1996 is the beginning of a consolidation phase, after a boom of the
REIT sector in the 1990s.
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Table 1: Variable Description
Variable Description Deﬁnition
Balance Sheet Aggregates
STD Short-term debt Debt payable within a business year
LTD Long-term debt Debt payable after a business year
EQU Common equity (shareholder equity) − (preferred equity)
DPROP Depreciable property PPE + accumulated depreciation
NFI Net of ﬁnancing and investment cash ﬂow ∆CCE − CF_Op
Instruments of Liquidity Management
CCE Cash & cash equivalents Cash or assets easily convertible into cash
LEV Market leverage (total debt) / (market value of assets)
LOC Lines of credit Aggregate lines of credit and other
revolving credit agreements available
CF_Op Operating CF Net cash provided by operating activities
Control Variables
S&P500 Standard & Poor's 500 Index ln(S&P500t / S&P500t−1)
MB Growth opportunities (market equity) / (book equity)
ROA Proﬁtability Return on assets
Size Size of a ﬁrm ln(total assets)
Dummies
Rating Access to public debt 1 if ﬁrm has investment-grade rating ...
Op_Risk Operating risk 1 if ﬁrm has CF volatility above the median ...
Inv_Shock Investment shock 1 if %-change is above the 55th percentile ...
FFO_Shock Shock on sustainable CF 1 if %-change is below the 45th percentile ...
... and 0 otherwise
Note: The table describes the variables used in the dynamic model for the two spotlights
on leverage. Mean and standard deviations of the dependent variables in the multi-equation
framework are reported in the respective estimation reports for the full sample, as well as
for each subsample.
variables with the beginning of the period value of total assets, rather than divide the
variables by non-cash-and-debt assets.
3.1 (Balance Sheet) Items Deﬁning the Identity
The variables STD for short-term debt, and LTD for long-term debt, describe the lia-
bilities of the company to a third party, whereas EQU for common equity, describes the
claims of the shareholders. DPROP for depreciable property is calculated as the sum
of property, plant and equipment (PPE) and accumulated depreciation. The diﬀerences
between DPROP over time characterize the net expenditures of the company in PPE.
In line with Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011), real estate investment, as the source
of collateral and asset tangibility, should increase the debt capacity of a ﬁrm. However,
from our point of view, net property (real estate) investment foregoes the link of inter-
nal ﬁnancing through depreciation.7 Hence, approximating the change in ﬁxed assets by
7Riddiough and Wu (2009) report that the 90% payout restriction transfers to 55%-70% pre-dividend
payout, whereas An et al. (2010) relate this to 85% of FFO. Both ﬁgures highlight the relevance of
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DPROP does not dilute the actual stock of real estate. Apart from minor aggregates, the
sum of operating, investment and ﬁnancing cash ﬂow is the change in CCE and completes
the identity, which is introduced in detail in the next section.
3.2 Instruments of Liquidity Management
The following sources are deﬁned as the instruments of liquidity management. Cash &
cash equivalents (CCE) describe the potential of the internal ﬁnance source for future
projects and increase the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. By contrast, market leverage (LEV)
is the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets and lowers a ﬁrm's debt capacity.
While market LEV is used throughout the analysis, the results are also compared to
book LEV, which is total debt to year-beginning total assets. The available lines of
credit (LOC) are a revolving debt source extended by a bank. On the one hand, they
oﬀer future ﬁnancial ﬂexibility for the ﬁrm, but on the other hand, they are subject to
fees for the unused lines.
3.3 Traditional Capital Structure Determinants
The following determinants are typical control variables used in capital structure studies.
The general (stock) market cycles inﬂuence the development of real estate ﬁrms with
respect to systematic risks and opportunities. This impact is incurred through the con-
tinuous returns of the S&P500. The market-to-book ratio (MB), calculated by market
equity divided by book equity, characterizes the idiosyncratic growth opportunity.8 The
proﬁtability of a ﬁrm  measured by return on assets (ROA)  may also inﬂuence the
capital structure, as it is easier to issue debt and equity for more proﬁtable ﬁrms. The
size of a ﬁrm is captured by the natural logarithm of its total assets, assuming decreasing
marginal economies of scale. With respect to balance sheet aggregates, a mechanical size
eﬀect on DPROP, STD, LTD and EQU is mitigated, due to scaling by total assets.
depreciation for internal funding
8Traditionally, MB is approximated by the deviation of market and book value of assets, rather than
equity. In order to reduce the mechanical relationship to market leverage, the latter possibility is chosen.
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3.4 Additional Dummies Approximating Firm Characteristics
The dummy Rating has a value of one, if the ﬁrm has at least an investment grade long-
term issuer rating from S&P, Moody's or Fitch. It approximates access to the public debt
market, due to relatively lower transaction costs and levels of asymmetric information.
The dummy Op_Risk equals one, if the volatility of operating CF exceeds the conditional
median of the twelve diﬀerent property segments. It approximates the operational risk
confronting a real estate company.
The two remaining dummies are unique to our research. As derived in the literature
section, it is of interest to determine whether a ﬁrm faces strong investment opportunities
or substantial CF shortfalls. Therefore, the Inv_Shock variable summarizes all observa-
tions with a percentage change of the market-to-book ratio above the 55th percentile,
conditional on the property segments. The computation for the FFO_Shock is similar.
This determinant indicates observations with low percentage changes in funds from op-
erations (FFO), if the changes are below the conditional 45th percentile. FFO is typically
calculated by adding real estate depreciation to the GAAP net income, excluding gains or
losses from sales of properties or debt restructuring, and is interpreted as the sustainable
cash ﬂow. Observations with low (more negative) percentage changes in their FFOs are
assumed to trigger higher leverage and lower equity.
3.5 Dealing with Cross-Industry Variation
It is common in real estate ﬁnance to allow for varying intercepts for diﬀerent property
segments. However, Ertugrul and Giambona (2011) show that the relative standing of
a ﬁrm within its property focus segment (micro industry) is essential for determining
leverage. The rationale behind this approach is simply that it is not appropriate to
compare proﬁtability, leverage, or, as in this study, diﬀerent forms of hedging tools of
e.g. an oﬃce with a residential property company. Table (2) contains the t-statistics of
Welch's t-test for the sources of liquidity across property segments. The results of the
t-test, whether the segment means are equal to the sample mean, indicate that 10 of 21
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conditional means are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the overall sample mean.
Table 2: Cross-Industry Variance for Financial Liquidity Instruments
LEV CCE LOC
Property Focus N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat
All 558 0.406 558 0.015 558 0.162
Oﬃce 103 0.411 -0.5 103 0.012 2.261* 103 0.167 -0.597
Residential 103 0.424 -1.779 103 0.011 3.337** 103 0.167 -0.737
Retail 122 0.446 -3.445*** 122 0.013 1.295 122 0.164 -0.264
Industrial 40 0.407 -0.072 40 0.018 -0.87 40 0.162 -0.052
Hotel 58 0.374 1.931 58 0.022 -2.492* 58 0.146 1.448
Diversiﬁed 59 0.415 -0.549 59 0.018 -1.714 59 0.131 3.286**
Others 73 0.327 6.054*** 73 0.019 -1.584 73 0.182 -2.278*
Note: This table shows the t-statistics (t-stat) of Welch's t-test. LEV refers to the market
leverage. CCE refers to cash & cash equivalents, LOC to lines of credit available, both scaled
by year-beginning total assets. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Therefore, we compare the results of the high and low subsamples. According to
the ﬁrm characteristics of the respective twelve property segments, a ﬁrm enters the
low (high) subsample, if it yields a value below (above) the 45th (55th) percentile for a
given ﬁrm characteristic. The characteristics are LEV, CCE, LOC, MB, ROA and Size.
Furthermore, subsamples are constructed for the boom years (1996-1999, 2003-2007 and
2009-2010), bust years (2000-2002 and 2008) and for the sample before the late-2000s
ﬁnancial crisis (before 2008). Moreover, the attributes of whether a ﬁrm 'is rated as
investment grade', 'has an above-median cash ﬂow volatility' or 'experienced positive as
opposed to negative cash-ﬂow changes' are identiﬁed accordingly.
4 Model
The concept underlying this paper is basically that of combining the cash ﬂow statement
approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) with the balance-sheet view of Chen
and Zhao (2007).
More speciﬁcally, the ideas that we adopt are a system of equations, estimated by
weighted least squares, where the weight is reciprocal to the number of observations per
year. By also following the advice of Petersen (2009), the methodological diﬀerence, is
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that we decided to include year dummies in order to account for time eﬀects.9 An even
more important diﬀerence is that we do not need to de-ﬁne our identity, but eliminate
48 ﬁrm-year observations which do not satisfy the conditions in equations (1) and (2).10
Cash F low from Operationsi,t
+ Cash F low from Financingi,t
+ Cash F low from Investmenti,t
= ∆Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE)i,t
(1)
Through equation (1), we relate the operating cash ﬂow (CF_Op) to changes in bal-
ance sheet items by modeling
Operating CFi,t
!
=− (Financing CFi,t + Investment CFi,t)− ...
−∆Depreciable Propertyi,t + ∆STDi,t + ∆LTDi,t + ...
+ ∆Common Equityi,t + ∆Resid(All)i,t + errori,t
(2)
9Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) demeaned their variables by the year means, which is associated
with a manual adjustment of conﬁdence intervals (especially in smaller samples like ours). Accordingly,
after demeaning our sample, the year dummies re-main jointly signiﬁcant.
10Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) did not capture the whole cash-ﬂow statement and thus had to
deﬁne this identity in combination with a penalty function.
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where:
NFIi,t = Financing CFi,t + Investment CFi,t
∆Resid(All)i,t = ∆Resid(Assets)i,t + ∆Resid(Liab.&Equi.)i,t
∆Resid(Assets)i,t = ∆Total Assetsi,t −∆Depreciable Propertyi,t − ...
−∆(CCE)i,t
∆Resid(Liab.&Equi.)i,t = ∆ (Liabilitiesi,t − Total Debti,t) + ...
+ ∆Total Mezzaninei,t + ∆Preferred Equityi,t
errori,t = −∆Total Assetsi,t + ∆STDi,t + ∆LTDi,t + ...
+ ∆Common Equityi,t + ∆Resid(Liab.&Equi.)i,t
The ﬁrst two summands of equation (2) expresses the change in total assets, while
the second row expresses the change in equity plus liabilities of the variables in our focus.
The change in Resid(All) subsumes the remaining aggregates of the balance sheet.11
Moreover, we allow for a maximum deviation of $100,000 in equation (2)
|errori,t|
!
< 100, 000
Therefore, the basic model accounting for Spotlight B can be written as
11The sum of ﬁnancing and investment cash ﬂow was originally allocated to the change in Resid(All),
which should only play a minor role for the system dynamics. However, the dynamics of this variable
were too often signiﬁcant, due to the substantial relevance of these two cash ﬂows.
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
∆Resid(All)i,t
∆STDi,t
∆LTDi,t
∆EQUi,t
∆DPROPi,t
∆NFIi,t

=Γ ·

∆Resid(All)i,t−1
∆STDi,t−1
∆LTDi,t−1
∆EQUi,t−1
∆DPROPi,t−1
∆NFIi,t−1

+ Λ · CF_Opi,t + ...
+ Π ·

S&P500i,t
MBi,t
ROAi,t
SIZEi,t

+ Ψ ·

Ratingi,t
Op_Riski,t
Inv_Shocki,t
FFO_Shocki,t

+ i,t
(3)
or in compact form
Y = Γ · L.Y + Λ · CF_Op+ Π · C + Ψ ·D + i,t
'Y' represents all the right hand side variables of equation (2), which are also imple-
mented as lagged regressors.12 Operating cash ﬂows 'CF_Op', as well as the ﬁrm char-
acteristics 'C', namely S&P500, MB, ROA and Size are proposed as contemporaneous
independent variables. The dummies 'D' (Rating, Op-Risk, Inv_Shock and FFO_Shock)
complete equation (3).13 By construction, it follows that all coeﬃcients per row add up
to zero, but the operating CF's impact on 'Y' sum to one.
12Besides Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010), the funding cycle of Brown and Riddiough (2003) in
conjunction with Riddiough and Wu (2009) would also suggest this dynamic framework.
13We also considered dummies like 'incorporated in Delaware or Maryland', 'ﬁrm is a REIT', 'ﬁrm age'
etc., that are partially implemented in real estate corporate ﬁnance research. However, due to the
limited useful and signiﬁcant insights thus obtained, we disregard these characteristics.
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Table 3: Basic Model (according to equation (3))
(1)+(2)+(3)+...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) +(4)−(5)−(6)
Resid(All) STD LTD EQU DPROP NFI Balance Sheet
Identity
L.Resid(All) 0.133 -0.299* -0.720* -0.527** -0.965** -0.447*** 0.0000033
(0.62) (-1.84) (-1.90) (-2.50) (-2.08) (-5.53)
L.STD 0.168 -0.660*** -0.231 -0.409* -0.686 -0.446*** 0.0000077
(0.82) (-3.65) (-0.58) (-1.96) (-1.42) (-5.37)
L.LTD 0.181 -0.260 -0.604 -0.447** -0.681 -0.449*** 0.0000061
(0.90) (-1.54) (-1.60) (-2.26) (-1.48) (-5.62)
L.EQU 0.179 -0.234 -0.576 -0.460** -0.646 -0.445*** 0.0000014
(0.91) (-1.39) (-1.57) (-2.40) (-1.50) (-5.60)
L.DPROP -0.166 0.288* 0.784** 0.558*** 1.009** 0.456*** -0.0000057
(-0.80) (1.68) (2.01) (2.74) (2.14) (5.52)
L.NFI -0.217 0.052 0.677** 0.518*** 0.906** 0.124** -0.0000091
(-1.49) (0.38) (2.01) (3.26) (2.42) (2.05)
CF_Op 0.169 -0.006 1.192*** 0.453** 1.760*** -0.952*** 0.9999973
(1.03) (-0.05) (3.48) (2.48) (4.08) (-15.62)
S&P500 0.021 -0.005 0.068* 0.055*** 0.123*** 0.016** -0.0000002
(1.30) (-0.26) (1.75) (3.22) (4.32) (1.98)
MB -0.005** -0.002 0.019*** -0.008*** 0.004 0.001 0.0000001
(-2.11) (-0.72) (3.61) (-2.69) (0.52) (0.84)
ROA -0.003* -0.000 -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.005** 0.001** 0.0000000
(-1.98) (-0.54) (-3.86) (4.36) (-2.17) (1.99)
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.0000000
(-0.58) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.73) (-1.53) (0.89)
Rating -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.0000000
(-0.50) (-1.32) (1.60) (0.43) (0.92) (-0.83)
Op_Risk -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.0000000
(-0.61) (0.37) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.51)
Inv_Shock 0.011*** -0.004 -0.012 -0.016*** -0.021** -0.001 0.0000002
(2.68) (-1.19) (-1.65) (-4.21) (-2.38) (-0.65)
FFO_Shock -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.013** -0.016* -0.000 -0.0000001
(-0.13) (0.65) (-0.65) (-2.57) (-1.69) (-0.00)
N 558 558 558 558 558 558
adj. R-sq 0.024 0.160 0.229 0.209 0.225 0.676
N_clust 140 140 140 140 140 140
Mean(y) 0.021 0.008 0.049 0.030 0.105 -0.062
St.Dev(y) 0.048 0.048 0.094 0.052 0.108 0.026
Note: This table shows results based on equation (3). STD refers to short-term debt, LTD to long-term debt,
EQU to common equity, DPROP to depreciable property, NFI to the net of the ﬁnancing and investment
cash ﬂow, Resid(All) subsumes all remaining balance sheet items as deﬁned in equation (2), all measured
in ﬁrst diﬀerences and scaled by year-beginning total assets. CF_Op refers to operating cash ﬂow scaled
by year-beginning total assets. S&P500 refers to the continuous return of the S&P500 index, MB to the
ratio of market value over book value of equity, ROA to return on assets, Size to the ln of total assets. The
dummy Rating is equal to one, if a ﬁrm has an investment grade rating, Op_Risk is equal to one, if a ﬁrm's
cash ﬂows are above the median in the respective property segment, Inv_Shock is equal to one, if a ﬁrm's
percentage change in MB is above the 55th percentile in the respective property segment, FFO_Shock is
equal to one, if a ﬁrm's percentage change of FFO is below the 45th percentile in the respective property
segment, and zero otherwise. Year dummies are not reported. N denotes ﬁrm-year observations of each
equation, N_cluster denotes the number of observed ﬁrms, Mean(y) and St.Dev.(y) represent mean and
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The last column illustrates the accounting identity deﬁned in
equation (2). T-stats are in parenthesis, ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
This is basically the modeling aspect of emphasizing leverage. Liquidity management
is essential in modeling ﬁnancing decisions. Therefore, the other spotlight highlights the
debt ratio from interactions with competing sources of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, namely CCE
and LOC. Therefore, the full model adds LEV, CCE and LOC to equation (3). The
quadratic terms of these three sources are also implemented, since no previous study has
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so far explored potential non-linear relationships between LEV, CCE and LOC. In the
manner, interactions between the three instruments of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility are dependent
on the original level, which is the main reason for the quadratic terms (i.e. Suﬁ 2007, for
LOC and CCE or Gamba and Triantis (2008), for cash and debt).
Y = Γ · L.Y + Λ · CF_Op+ Π · C + Ψ ·D + Σ · S + Ω · S2 + i,t (4)
where
S =

LEVi,t−1
CCEi,t−1
LOCi,t−1

Finally, we challenge equation (4) with respect to three diﬀerent 'sets' of conditions.
The ﬁrst simply splits our sample in economic up- and downturns, as well as the sub-
sample before the recent late 2000s ﬁnancial crisis. Second, rather than interpreting ﬁrm
characteristics typically used in capital structure research (MB, ROA and Size), we com-
pare subsamples with low and high levels for these variables of interest. The same is
done for the sources of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, in order to take a further look at how relation-
ships are dependent on the original level (rankings are deﬁned according to the respective
property focus, see data section). In addition, subsamples are compared with respect to
Rating, Op_Risk and the change in CF_Op.
Y (X|subsample) = Γ · L.Y + Λ · CF_Op+ Π · C + Ψ ·D + Σ · S + Ω · S2 + i,t (5)
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5 Results
This section is also separated in Spotlight A and Spotlight B and all conditional subsam-
ples are considered. However, only full sample and conditional estimations with respect
to time and MB, ROA and Size, as well as LEV, CCE and LOC are reported.14
5.1 Spotlight A
In the literature section, it was pointed out that the negative LOC-CCE interactions seem
to be empirically robust. Across the 22 subsamples, we ﬁnd a robust negative (non-linear)
relationship for CCE on LOC, but only six subsamples reveal reverse causality.
The literature section did not provide a robust prediction of how LEV ﬁts into the
dynamics of this discussion. Initially, LEV yields contrary interactions with LOC. If sig-
niﬁcant, the 'negative' causality runs from LEV to LOC and only for the squared terms
(14/22 subsamples). Furthermore, we ﬁnd four negative (four positive) impacts of LOC
on LEV, most obviously for the subsamples low (high) CCE and low (high) LOC ﬁrms.
This could simply be due to the chronology of the funding cycle of Riddiough and Wu
(2009). If LEV increases due to the use of LOC, then a negative relationship follows
technically. Alternatively, if debt decreases due to the repayment of outstanding debt,
the next funding cycle is established by blowing up LOC. On the other hand, if LOC
increases, it is not clear when the ﬁrm draws these lines. Moreover, the LOC-LEV inter-
actions are exclusively the case for the squared terms (except for small ﬁrms).
Second, LEV-CCE interactions are much weaker. LEV positively drives CCE in 6/22
subsamples, which is also restricted to the squared terms. In contrast, CCE negatively
impacts on LEV in 3/22 sub-samples. This is the case for the high LOC and high CCE
ﬁrms, as well as for ﬁrms with high CF volatility. A reason for this might be that on
the one hand, having a reasonable amount of one of these two sources, the marginal
value of lowering debt as the third source increases. On the other hand, high CCE or
14All estimations are, as always, available on request.
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LOC subsamples imply that these ﬁrms are able to aﬀord a drop in ﬁnancial ﬂexibility
by lowering CCE, accompanied by an increase in debt. In the case of ﬁrms with highly
volatile cash ﬂows, we argue that CCE will be used before debt increases, in the event of
a CF shortfall. Accordingly, both instruments will be 'reloaded' (more CCE, less debt)
after positive movements from the CF mean.
In short, in four of the six subsamples, in which LEV is signiﬁcant with respect to
CCE, LEV is also signiﬁcant for LOC. Alternatively, the relationship of LEV on CCE
(LOC) is always positive (negative). If signiﬁcant, CCE on LEV is always negative and
in these subsamples, LOC on LEV is always positively signiﬁcant. Hence, the above
stochastic argument of a reverse relationship of CCE and LOC on LEV and vice versa
holds for each of the 22 subsamples. This can be observed directly in the sub-samples
high CCE, high LOC and high Op_Risk.
Before discussing the remaining variables, four ﬁndings are highlighted. First, the ex-
pected strong, empirical, negative relationship of LOC and CCE is reduced to a causality
from CCE to LOC. Second, causality also seems to be stronger for LEV on LOC and
for LEV on CCE, compared to the reverse causalities. Third, the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility
perspective provides the basis for a complementary relationship of CCE and LEV and a
substitutive one of CCE and LOC. Finally, the dependence on the original level of one or
the other source is strongly suggested by a dominance of signiﬁcant squared terms. Also,
the change in signs of signiﬁcant relationships in the case of LOC on LEV, dependent on
low/high CCE or LOC ﬁrms, clearly demonstrate the importance of the original level.
It was expected that CF would positively aﬀect LOC (Suﬁ (2009)), whereas a CF-CCE
relationship was expected for constraint subsamples. However, CF plays only a minor role
within this framework. The results suggest only one positive estimate for LEV (during
economic downturns), one negative estimate for CCE (low MB ﬁrms) and two positive
estimates for LOC (high Size and low Op_Risk ﬁrms). S&P500 aﬀects LEV negatively,
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while it aﬀects CCE positively; LOC is negatively aﬀected by the S&P500 continuous
returns for high ROA, low LEV and high LOC ﬁrms. Diﬀerences in the market and
book value of equity (MB) are negatively associated with LEV. However, MB inﬂuences
LOC positively (10/22 subsamples), fully consistent with ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, where ﬁrms
with growth opportunities prepare to counter underinvestment due to potential liquidity
gaps. As expected, CCE plays a subordinate role as a hedging tool, but is, as with LOC,
positively driven by MB in ﬁve subsamples. In accordance with the argument given for
LEV-CCE interactions, two of the ﬁve subsamples are low LEV and high LOC ﬁrms,
hence, the marginal value of accumulating CCE as the third source increases in response
to a MB increase.
Accordingly, ROA and Size aﬀect LEV negatively. However, the latter relationship
is much weaker. Moreover, both CCE and LOC are inﬂuenced marginally by (positive)
ROA dynamics. In contrast, a negative Size eﬀect applies to both liquidity instruments,
implying that ﬁrm size substitutes for ﬁnancial ﬂexibility to some extent. This is even
more the case for LOC (16/22 subsamples). Accordingly, high LEV, low CCE and low
LOC ﬁrms yield a negative size eﬀect for LOC, while their counterparts do not reveal
such eﬀects with any signiﬁcance. Low LEV ﬁrms even yield a positive relationship of
Size on CCE.15 This exception is illustrated by the subsample Size itself, in which large
ﬁrms yield a negative relationship of Size to LOC, whereas small ﬁrms yield a positively
signiﬁcant relationship.
The impact of the set of dummies is less evident. Rated ﬁrms in general have lower
levels of CCE, moreover they have less debt. Firms with higher Op_Risk seem to have
higher levels of borrowing and lending in order to smooth out the variance.16 Shocks pri-
15Since growth opportunities approximate for a need for ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, we observe a positive estimate
of Size on CCE for high MB ﬁrms, whereas the counterpart yields a negative one.
16Despite little signiﬁcant estimates, the size subsample again delivered ambiguous results. Small ﬁrms
with an operating risk hold less LOC, but their counterparts just do the reverse. This is contrary to
the negative Size eﬀect for liquidity instrument stated above. A reason for this might be that small
ﬁrms with volatile cash ﬂows receive less LOC in general, while big ﬁrms additionally hedge against
CF shortfalls contrary to big ﬁrms without a high operating risk.
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marily aﬀect LEV, investment shocks negatively (19/22 subsamples), FFO shocks posi-
tively (8/22 subsamples).17 There is some additional discussion with respect to the shock
dummies in the section on the mechanical aspects of leverage.
5.2 Spotlight B
The interpretation of Spotlight B is reduced to the discussion of LTD, EQU, DPROP
and LEV.18
First of all, the motivating aspects described above are addressed by investigating
how often there is an impact on LTD or EQU, but LEV is unaﬀected and vice versa.
For this reason, we employ two approaches. On the one hand, we follow the suggestion
of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) by interpreting the number of signiﬁcant esti-
mators in rows of matrix Γ of equation (5) as impulses of the independent variable, and
signiﬁcances in columns as responses (recall table (4)). Focusing on responses, we ﬁnd 18
(27) signiﬁcant oﬀ-diagonal estimators for LTD (EQU), but only 22 for LEV.19 We addi-
tionally pose the simple question of how often LTD and/or EQU are aﬀected by capital
structure variables, but LEV remains unchanged. Across the 22 subsample regressions,
it is primarily MB that aﬀects LTD and/or EQU 19 times, while LEV remains unchanged.
With respect to Size, we rarely ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects, since we scaled by the year-
beginning total as-sets. As stated above, a negative relationship of Size is evidently the
case for LEV. MB positively (negatively) impacts LTD (EQU) and hence yields a signiﬁ-
17One exception is that Inv_Shock shows a positive sign to LEV before the late-2000s ﬁnancial crisis.
18However, worth mentioning is the fact that the sum of ﬁnancing and investment CF shows the most
considerable signiﬁcances in our system. Hence, ﬁndings of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) that
these two 'activities' would balance each other so that ﬁnancing-investment sensitivities are mitigated
cannot be stated for the real estate market. Moreover, aspects of debt maturity as suggested by
Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) or Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) are simply modeled,
though not reported, by distinguishing between short and long term debt.
19Assuming persistence in accounting variables, we ignore signiﬁcances of lagged dependent variables.
When we include lagged dependent variable, it is leverage, of course, which shows the highest persis-
tence, since it is not measured in ﬁrst diﬀerences (LTD 19, EQU 29, and LEV 42). Dependent variables
with more responses are also said to be shock absorbers (Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010)).
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cantly negative sign to LEV, moreover, rarely it aﬀects DPROP positively. In accordance
with the arguments relating to the mechanical aspects, a negative MB-LEV relationship
may be attributed to market valuation, which is in the numerator of MB, but in the
denominator of LEV. Analogously, this is assumed to be valid for EQU.
Finally, ROA positively (negatively) drives EQU (LTD and LEV)  which was ex-
pected. However, a negative impact of 'proﬁtability' on DPROP can again be attributed
either to mechanics (median depreciable property accounts for 96% of total assets, which
is the denominator of ROA) or is a further illustration of cash ﬂows being a superior
measure of a company's soundness.
CF strictly shows positive impacts on LTD, EQU and DPROP and does not aﬀect
LEV, apart from the 'bust-subsample'. The most impressive instance is the very high
magnitude of estimates of CF for these three variables. While a $1 increase in operating
cash ﬂow robustly leads EQU to increase within a range of $0.35 to $0.66, estimators
of LTD are between $0.27 (low Size) and a much higher $1.37 (low Op_Risk). DPROP
is aﬀected between $1.01 (low LEV) to $2.80 (during Bust) by a $1.00 increase of CF.
These results suggest that ﬁrms use the improvement in cash-ﬂow-based credit-quality
ratios due to cash-ﬂow increases and acquire more debt. Taking the full sample estima-
tion as a benchmark, for each subsample, it can be stated that the higher the CF-LTD
sensitivity the higher the CF-DPROP sensitivity.
In order to understand this, recall the identity of equation (3). Assume also that
Resid(All) and STD play a minor role, and further assume that a $1 change in operating
CF transfers to a $1 change in the sum of ﬁnancing and investment CF whereas EQU is
very robustly aﬀected by about $0.52 (whole sample). A strong connection between LTD
and DPROP caused by operating CF then follows logical-ly.
Accordingly, S&P500 also positively inﬂuences all variables considered, but positive
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Figure 2: Liaison of Debt and Investment via Cash Flows
Note: This ﬁgure plots the marginal impacts of operating cash ﬂows (CF_Op)
to changes in long-term debt (LTD) and changes in common equity (EQU)
against the marginal impacts of CF_Op to changes in depreciable property
(DPROP).
market returns imply a lower LEV. The dummies Rating and Op_Risk rarely yield signiﬁ-
cant estimates. Across all estimations, INV_Shock and FFO_Shock yield a negative sign
for LTD, EQU and DPROP very robustly. However, while INV_Shock results in a lower
LEV, a FFO_Shock is compensated for by a higher LEV. This conﬁrms the debt capacity
argument of future investment opportunities, by investment shocks robustly resulting in
a lower leverage. Therefore, if both variables are signiﬁcant in the same equation, the
magnitudes of the estimates are fairly equal. This also highlights the need to identify
drivers of ﬁnancial decisions, since an investment shock seems to aﬀect balance sheet
changes similarly to an FFO shock, but the inference for LEV yields reverse dynamics.
5.3 Book Leverage
While MB yields a negative relationship to market LEV, it turns into a positively signif-
icant one for book LEV. Since it was argued that the negative correlation results from
a mechanical relationship, one would rely on book LEV. However, consider two identi-
cally characterized ﬁrms with diﬀerent market valuations. The higher valued ﬁrm would
certainly have better access to ﬁnancing sources. Yet, would a ﬁrm that is not other-
wise constrained be interested in this? The calculus of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility would refute
such behavior. Indeed, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant results for most of the 'good' subsamples
(high LOC, high ROA, high Size, rated ﬁrms and low Op_Risk). Most surprisingly, the
Inv_Shock dummy does not change its sign, even though it is less often signiﬁcant (9 for
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book versus 19 for market LEV). In line with the original motivation for this approxi-
mation, it is signiﬁcantly negative, especially for ﬁnancially inﬂexible ﬁrms. On the one
hand, one might see this as a further indication of the interactions of the three sources
suggested in this paper being valid. On the other hand, it is evident that especially ﬁrms
that are ﬁnancially constrained and/or are confronted with potential underinvestment
preserve debt capacity.
A further important diﬀerence is that book leverage is very sensitive to CF. Speciﬁ-
cally, a $1.00 increase in CF translates into about the same increase in debt. ROA remains
robustly negative and Size remains understated.20 FFO_Shock is only signiﬁcant twice,
suggesting that the bulk of variance in substantial FFO declines is priced by the capital
market. Moreover, general causalities stated for market LEV do not change, despite a
lesser appearance of linear and squared terms being signiﬁcant.
With respect to Spotlight B, the approach of Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010),
we ﬁnd the opposite. That is, we obtain 12 (23) oﬀ-diagonal elements for LTD (EQU)
of Γ in equation (3) but 54 for LEV. There is even more evidence of LEV eliminating
information, since we count 5/2/3 signiﬁcant estimates of MB/ROA/Size for LTD and/or
EQU, whereas LEV remains unchanged across the 22 subsamples.
6 Conclusion
This paper emphasizes the importance of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility as the critical missing link for
an empirically viable capital structure study. Financial ﬂexibility allows ﬁrms to access
and restructure their ﬁnancing activities at a low cost. Furthermore, it prevents ﬁrms
from ﬁnancial distress during economic downturns and allows for investments in value-
raising projects when they arise. We decided to investigate the capital structure of US
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and Real Estate Operating Companies (REOCs)
by two approaches, spotlights A and B. In our investigation, ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is deﬁned
20In this sense, results based on book leverage suggest the pecking-order theory to be valid.
26
in the sense of anticipating liquidity management instruments of leverage (LEV), cash &
cash equivalents (CCE) and lines of credit (LOC). At the beginning of this paper, the
position of leverage as one of the sources of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility (Spotlight A), as well as
technical attributes of this ratio (Spotlight B) were outlined.
This study can be seen as a bridge between emphasizing the characteristics of leverage
in the function of a ratio on the one hand, and classifying leverage as a driver of liquidity
management on the other hand. One of our ﬁndings is that leverage (LEV) drives cash
& cash equivalents (CCE) positively, but drives lines of credit (LOC) negatively. While
the latter result, as well as the substitutive relationship of cash & cash equivalents and
lines of credit are backed by the existing literature, the positive LEV-CCE relationship
is contrary to previous studies. This underlines the importance of credit lines for ﬁrms'
liquidity management. The positive inﬂuence of leverage on cash & cash equivalents can
be explained by ﬁrms' strategy to accumulate cash in order to fund investments when
proﬁtable opportunities arise. In addition, our interaction results of LEV, CCE and LOC
are consistent with the typical funding cycle suggested by Riddiough and Wu (2009). The
typical funding cycle can be separated into the following steps. Anticipating investment
opportunities, a ﬁrm arranges lines of credit with its bank. Subsequently, it begins to work
with its acquisition and after it reaches stable inﬂows, equity or long-term debt securities
are issued. Hence, the earnings are used to pay down lines of credit and recreate a
new funding cycle. This development can be found in our results. The investment
shock dummy  unique to our research an measuring if a ﬁrm faces strong investment
opportunities  yields signiﬁcant negative results with respect to the observation of ﬁrms
lowering leverage, i.e. preserving debt capacity after investment shocks. In contrast, FFO
shocks  measuring if a ﬁrm exhibits little change in funds from operations (FFO) 
aﬀect balance sheet aggregates very similarly to investment shocks, but generally result
in leverage increases. This highlights the need to identify drivers of ﬁnancial decisions,
since an investment shock seems to aﬀect balance sheet changes similarly to an FFO
shock, but the inference for leverage yields reverse dynamics.
Furthermore, our results derive the following major implications for managers. So far,
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real estate companies have almost abandoned cash as a hedging instrument. High cash
reserves would hedge against the risk of underinvestment and cash ﬂow shortfalls, but
mainly against the latter. However, our results show that this hedging capacity is rarely
used. In addition, decision makers tend to overdo investments after a cash ﬂow increase.
This can be noticed during economic downturns, before the late-2000s ﬁnancial crisis,
for highly leveraged ﬁrms, for low cash & cash equivalents ﬁrms and for relatively large
ﬁrms.
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